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ABSTRACT 
 
The intention of present thesis was to grasp a genuinely Chinese perspective on issues 
concerning international foreign politics and world affairs. A hypothetical-deductive 
method was used based on a questionnaire submitted to thirty-eight academicians of 
diverse academic backgrounds and age groups.  
 
The overall perception is that world affairs and regional politics are overwhelmingly 
dominated by the USA which is though the major Chinese foreign policy partner. Russia 
is the most significant regional partner whereas Japan is unanimously considered 
aggressive and ambitious, especially because of its alleged attempts to remilitarize.   
 
The Chinese consider as the major threat the unsettled Taiwanese issue whereas terrorism 
and nuclear threats are a far marginal matter for their security, which would improve by 
strengthening multilateralism and regional integration. The UN and the European raison 
d’être and modus operandi appear as a significant model to look at to improve regional 
integration and stability for reasons of economic growth, regional economic integration 
and peace.  
 
In Northeast Asia a peaceful settlement of the Korean issue is advocated and China is 
considered as the major regional power. The international community is perceived as 
positively accepting this “peaceful” Chinese preeminence but signs of worries are 
detected among Asian neighbors.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Background 
 
The three actors which currently affect the most the security setting of East Asia, i.e. 
Japan, the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 
are going through substantial changes whose outcomes will be the most determinant 
factors for the future regional security. 
 
Japan, the biggest investor in East Asia, is in the middle of one of its deepest national 
identity crisis. Before being able of taking a long-term clear international stance, it has to 
overcome its “national stagnation” and try to define what role it wants to play with the 
rest of the world. The first and most-immediate sphere this decision will be relevant for is 
apparently the remilitarization issue. 
 
The People’s Republic of China, on the other hand, is undoubtedly emerging as a world 
economic giant but its political weight does not seem to develop in the same 
uncontroversial, far-reaching and determined way. China a poor tradition with regard to 
“active and prompt diplomacy” and crisis-management and it is not clear whether Beijing 
has a clear long-term foreign policy strategy, at least encompassing the “Sino-centric 
world”. 
 
North Korea instead is still trying to keep afloat the delicate balance between reform and 
survival, aware as it is that too many reforms would result in the regime demise but no 
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reform would bring the country to a disastrous collapse likewise. The main problem 
regarding the North Korean crisis rests less on the attempt of actually replacing the 
current regime than on the internationally shared desire not to disintegrate the country 
and to keep it alive although “in a more human way”. 
 
At a time of increasingly fast and remarkable world integration, to East Asia it seems still 
very hard to strengthen regional integration and go beyond the very good but strictly 
bilateral political agreements. The regional fear of “the Chinese threat” and of a possible 
Japanese remilitarization, the Sino-Japanese sensitive political issues still unsolved, the 
local territorial disputes are just some of the obstacles that seem to prevent the regional 
countries from achieving genuine, sound stability and security concert. This is though all 
the more necessary now that international challenges such as terrorism require solid 
international cooperation and not just country-to-country alliances. This means, 
moreover, redefining and assessing the relationship with the US, which need Japan and 
China at least as much as Tokyo and Beijing need Washington.  
 
The dilemma rests exactly on the contradiction of a region (which is all the more the most 
promising in economic terms for the near future) that seems still entrapped in its 
traditional controversies right when global integration increases and international 
cohesion is mostly needed. Within such a weak framework, fears of domino effects due 
to the North Korean misbehavior and of a regional and then globalized arm-race appear 
not only likely to occur but, even worse, too tangled to be peacefully handled.  
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2. Aim of the research  
 
The objective of the present thesis is to investigate a Chinese viewpoint on issues of 
current and future geopolitics, regarding both the Asia Pacific Region and the world at 
large.  
 
The Western world is used to listen to and read reviews and predictions about Northeast 
Asia which are regularly made by Westerners and consequently by means of Western 
concepts and points of view. No matter how aware such authors are that their cultural 
background is deeply different from the one of the countries they are “explaining”, they 
are inevitably still adopting Western lens to see and screen what happens elsewhere. Even 
when they admittedly make use of Asian concepts and values, their perspective will 
likely be still “civilization–biased” and will never acquire a completely genuine Asian 
perspective.  
 
Hence the wish of investigating how locals perceive these issues happening “at their 
home”. I will just stick to the Chinese viewpoint for reasons of practical feasibility and in 
particular I will refer to what a sample of academicians think about those issues.  
 
What I intend to understand is a Chinese perspective about current foreign relations at 
large and in particular about geopolitical scenarios in Northeast Asia. How do the 
interviewed Chinese perceive the international arena? What is their impression about 
major international actors? How do they feel to be perceived by such actors? What are 
the major challenges and goals of the present world and regional foreign policy? Which 
path should Beijing’s diplomacy embark on? How would they define the present world in 
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terms of security and peace? By answering to such questions, the Chinese sample will 
provide their own local viewpoint on matters otherwise usually depicted by a Western 
and “West-centric” perspective.  
 
I argue that it is noticeably important to grasp Chinese opinions in order to be able of 
adequately understand and handle major global issues. A correct and possibly complete 
comprehension of all actors’ view is the necessary and priority requirement for effective 
international cooperation and it is all the more fundamental given the poverty of materials 
available on such issues.  
 
3. Theoretical framework 
 
Once set the aim of grasping a genuine Chinese viewpoint on IR issues, I decided to 
describe it along a fil rouge. This is constituted by an idea provided by Wang Jisi in his 
essay “International Relations Theory and the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy: A 
Chinese Perspective”. In the conclusion of his survey he states: “Foreign policy reflects 
the culture of the society creating it. Chinese culture is not a coherent whole” (Wang, 
1994:504).  
 
Hence, I decided to investigate whether the Chinese foreign policy, filtered by a 
genuinely Chinese perspective, is incoherent.  
 
To fulfill my goal, I took into account several issues and nuances of current international 
relations. I consulted a diverse variety of bibliography as well as of current press in order 
to select the best issues to cover. Also in this stage I came to observe the disproportion 
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between the amount of data provided by Western scholars compared to that ensuing of 
Asian sources. Indeed, it is noteworthy that Wang himself starts his essay by reminding 
that “analytical works written by PRC scholars on Chinese foreign policy comparable to 
those by Western scholars are hardly available”. 
 
Nevertheless, I argue that foreign policy is an excellent branch to test the “Chinese social 
coherence” given Beijing’s increasing involvement in international politics. Unable and 
unwilling to keep a feeble participation to world affairs, China is contributing more and 
more to international political issues, both to better serve its domestic interests as well as 
to assert its leverage as an international Great Power. As indicated by Professor Harding, 
“In the 1990s China is attempting to reduce geopolitical tensions with as many nations as 
possible, so that it can devote all its resources and energies to the problems of 
modernization and reform, diversify its economic relationships, and preserve its strategic 
independence” (Harding, 1994:388).  
 
Thus, three ideas lead my research: “perception”, “Chinese foreign policy” and 
“coherence”.  
 
The idea of perception I refer to throughout my survey is part of what Steven I. Levine 
names Chinese “informal ideology”. Taken apart the traditional communist ideology (that 
constitutes the “formal ideology”), he detects the existence of a far more charismatic 
form of ideology connecting   the Chinese people. This is indeed an “informal ideology”, 
otherwise known as “culture” because it gathers all those values and habits that are 
unstated but shared and that determine the behavior of actors.  
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When it comes to the “culture of perception”, the Chinese informal ideology according to 
Levine rests on the following pillars: 
1. the greatness of the Chinese people and nation 
2. the Chinese right to a better fate and to a compensatory treatment for past 
injustices 
3. the Chinese right to be treated as a Great Power 
4. the untouchable Chinese national sovereignty 
5. the Chinese immutable and universal values determining foreign policy attitudes 
and practices (Levine, 1994: 32-45).   
 
Regarding Chinese foreign policy, I rely on Harding’s statement that the post-Mao 
Chinese foreign policy challenge is: “How to make the outside world, including the world 
of international organizations, safe for China’s entry into modernity” (Harding, 
1994:394). To this aim, according to Harding, China is intentionally changing “from a 
revolutionary system-transforming actor to a neo-realist system-maintaining status quo 
actor” (Harding, 1994:409).  
 
The underlying methodological concept of all this research is “coherence”, as defined by 
Aristotle‘s coherence theory of truth, according to which a group of statement is true only 
if consistent with previously indicated statements. Coherence is the hallmark of a series 
of statements deriving from an axiom and logically connected to each other with no 
contradiction.  
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4. Methodology 
 
The aim of my research being that of exploring ex novo a genuine Chinese viewpoint on 
geopolitical issues, I decided to make use of a questionnaire that I submitted to thirty-
eight academicians.  
 
The sample included both university students and professors whose academic background 
was heterogeneous and not necessarily IR. Age groups were different too. I divided the 
sample into three major age groups, one gathering people in their twenties (age group A), 
another representing people from thirty to fifty (age group B) and the last one including 
the over fifty (age group C). Interviewees were asked about their age when they received 
their questionnaire. 81.6 percent of the sample belongs to age group A, 10.6 percent to 
age group B and the remaining 7.9 percent to age group C.  
 
I came in touch with these interviewees during a monthly stay in Shanghai at Fudan 
University. There I was supervised by Professor Zhu Mingquan of the Dept. of 
International Politics who helped me considerably in finding the sample. I intentionally 
wanted interviewees to come from diverse academic backgrounds in order to get a more 
complete and reliable outcome. Putting questions on foreign policy to academicians of 
the IR environment would have limited the ensuing analysis in that it would have been 
just the perspective of professionals daily dealing with these issues and accurately 
updated about them. Instead, by widening the sample, I could get an overall image 
nurtured by the contribution of ordinary academicians as well. As a country’s population 
is made of extremely diverse people who contribute all together to their national public 
opinion regardless of the quantity and quality of the opinions at their disposal, I thought I 
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would get closer to such a national image by enlarging my selection criteria. I had to stick 
though to academicians as a matter of practical feasibility. Being in the PRC for that short 
period and not speaking Chinese, the best way to carry out a scientific work was to rely 
on people I could talk to by means of a common language and who were already into 
research issues.  
 
I thus drafted a questionnaire made of twenty-four questions and written in English. The 
vast majority of the sample could understand and speak fluently English, for those who 
could not my supervisor’s assistant worked as translator. The commonality of the 
language between me and the interviewees was at the same time a benefit and a problem 
for the research. It was beneficial because we used a language that was “neutral” to both 
me and them as it was neither mother-tongue. But using a sample whose mother-tongue 
is not the one adopted in the research was detrimental to the extent that the meaning of 
words and concepts used both by me and by them could not coincide. It is a matter of 
light nuances and of sensitivity to language, as it is suffused with interpretation (Parker, 
1999:2).  
 
The questions were basically of two kinds. In most cases, questions were to be answered 
by ticking one up to three items listed. Interviewees just had to choose which of the given 
replies was the closer to their viewpoint. On the other hand, there were open questions 
where the sample was asked to freely provide a description of a geopolitical actor. These 
were basically the questions strictly regarding perception and thus I thought the answer 
would be far more correct if the interviewees were left free to word themselves the 
description. However, I came to notice that Chinese people were not used to this latter 
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sort of questions and found it quite peculiar and curious. Free phrasing of concepts was 
very unusual to the sample and demanded a lot of their time and attention.  
 
Once gathered primary data, I analyzed the outcomes and detected major trends thereof.  
 
One may argue that so few questions and such a restricted sample can not be enough to 
provide an accurate answer to my research question but to this regard some 
considerations have to be made.  
 
First, the reliability  of a qualitative study rests on “asking good questions during the data 
collection process”(Yin, 2003:59-60). My questions touched upon different aspects of 
diverse issues. They considered both how Chinese perceive the rest of the world and how 
they feel to be perceived by it.  
 
Second, the sample involved people from different academic backgrounds, different age 
groups, different geographical origins and different experiences with the rest of the 
world. Students were indeed in Shanghai but not all of them came from the city, some 
came from the countryside, others from neighboring towns. Furthermore, 59 percent of 
the interviewees has never been either in Europe or in North America or in Japan, which 
is an important element in shaping their perception of these actors, their role and attitude.  
 
Thus the sample was quite little but meanwhile very diversified at its inside with 
reference to several aspects. As my intention was to grasp a perception and to test an 
hypothesis by means of a case-study analysis, I think that my methodological basis and 
my selection criteria make for reliability.  
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I am aware though that all these issues and their reciprocal connections would require a 
longer analysis than the one allowed by a ten thousand words dissertation. The ambition 
is to provide a correct answer to the research question. Rather than being approximate 
and superficial, I prefer to touch here the main outcomes of my survey and to provide an 
answer to the research questions, leaving to additional research the task of studying 
secondary connections and trends.  
 
5. Disposition  
 
In the main part of the thesis I will describe the outcomes of the questionnaires and in the 
final conclusion I will link these results to investigate whether they are logically 
connected and whether they prove the reliability of the above-mentioned literary 
references. 
 
To better appreciate the results of the survey, I intend to split the questionnaire topics into 
four main parts, each of which having a precise focus and not strictly following the order 
how the questions where submitted. 
 
First, I will study what I call the “Chinese perceptions” at large, i.e. how the considered 
Chinese sample perceives the rest of the world and how it thinks China is perceived by it. 
I argue that this preliminary part represents the inexorable framework through which the 
global results can be viewed1. 
                                                
1 The content of this part can be taken from answers to Questions 1, 4, 5, 6 and 13. 
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In the second part, “China and world politics”, I will go through the setting of Chinese 
foreign policy at large. I will touch upon both the current situation and the possible future 
scenarios2.  
 
Third, I will deal with the specific “Sino-Japanese relations” that stand for the most 
significant geopolitical axis in the region; hence the need for a special section devoted to 
the present health of this “partnership” and to its implications for future regional patterns 
of stability3.  
 
Fourth, I will touch upon “China and Northeast Asia”, thus underlining a regional focus 
area. Here I will deal with local hot issues, Chinese desirable foreign policy initiatives 
and hints about the future scenarios in the region4.  
                                                                                                                                            
 
2 The questions constituting the source for this part are Questions 2, 7, 8, 10 and 12. 
 
3 This chapter data come from answers to Questions 14 to 18. 
 
4 Answers to Questions 3, 8, 9, 11 and 19 to 24 stand for the basis of this analysis.  
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CHINESE PERCEPTION OF THE FUTURE GEOPOLITICAL ROLE 
OF THE P.R.C. 
 
1. CHINESE PERCEPTIONS 
 
1.1 How China perceives global politics actors 
 
The sample was asked to describe how they perceive the following actors: the USA, 
Europe, Russia, Japan and the United Nations. 
 
The perception the interviewees have about the United States is the clearer and neater: the 
American actor is depicted as a hegemonic, powerful, strong, arrogant leader5 of world 
affairs, skillfully dominating the global politics with an imperialistic approach. Chinese 
are doubtless that the US plays the central role in determining the course of present world 
politics and they differentiate on the reasons of this political hegemony, which they 
alternatively explain in terms of richness, greed, power or arrogance. 
 
The perception of Europe is instead quite blur. The Old Continent is generally perceived 
as an important actor that is going through a process of evolution and is appreciated for 
its cooperative skills. A rising key player, Europe is sometimes conceived as independent 
but more often as a still passive partner of the US. Its valuable contribution to world 
peace is constantly remarked as well as its kind approach to world affairs, which even 
make of Europe a model Asia should look at, as 2.7 percent of the interviewees wrote. 
                                                
5 I write in Italics the words the interviewees themselves chosed to use. 
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Russia is mostly considered as a declining big actor, currently dealing with its domestic 
problems, first its insecurity and instability; to these, problems such as ambiguity, 
unreliability  and passivity are added by a few interviewees. Nevertheless in Chinese eyes 
Russia remains a potentially significant world player, endowed with a noticeable power 
and strength. In spite of a general view of Russia as of a declining power, 34.4 percent of 
the definitions used by the interviewees depict an image of the former Cold War Power 
as of a significant, big and strong power, having a noticeable potential and slowly 
recovering to emerge on the international stage where it plays an indispensable role. 
Hence, the Chinese image of Russia is quite controversial, with people seeing its present 
instability as a sign of permanent decline and others looking at this precariousness as a 
transitory problem of a nevertheless strong international power.  
 
With regard to Japan, the interviewed sample is unanimous: the unpleasant neighbor is 
first of all an aggressive and ambitious actor, economically powerful and generally loyal 
to the US, currently trying to be acknowledged as a major international player. Foxy and 
challenging as it is nowadays, it is actively changing on its way to a new growth and thus 
represents a threat.  
 
That of the UN is a confused image, too. Mostly conceived as an important player when 
it comes to global mediation, balance and compromise-search, the international 
institution is both considered important, necessary and strong as well as feeble, impotent, 
rhetorical and by 12.5 percent of the interviewees even useless. The overall definitions 
used have a positive connotation, stressing the UN legitimate bargaining role but 
nonetheless half of them rather underlines how limited, disabled, weak and declining such 
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a role currently is. Thus we can assume that the ideal UN figure is positively appreciated 
whereas its empirical activity and modus operandi, especially with regards to recent 
events, is deeply criticized and skeptically trusted.  
 
It is interesting to remark how the interviewees appreciate the mediating role both of the 
UN and of Europe at the light of the different missions of the two institutions. This 
appreciation is coherent with an outcome of Wang Jisi’s analysis, who noted that “the 
present Chinese leadership has pursued a role of ‘balancer’ in world politics” (Wang, 
1994:486). In other words, the interviewees’ stress on the importance of the mediating 
role of the EU and UN in their arena confirms a Chinese attitude in dealing with foreign 
affairs: negotiating to find a satisfactory compromise is to them the most efficient avenue 
to a sound international stability.   
 
1.2 How China feels to be perceived  
 
The vast majority of the sample has the feeling that the international community 
perceives China as a developing rising power that is becoming increasingly important 
and stronger. 76.3 percent of the words used to describe this perception indeed refer to 
the emerging, booming and changing status of their homeland. 19 percent of the total 
definitions used mention adjectives such as peaceful, gentle, promising, trustful, fair, 
responsible and pragmatic that further convey a positive image that, according to 
Chinese, foreigners have about the Middle Empire. Thus, generally speaking the 
interviewees do not detect any sign of fear or criticism by foreign actors with regard to 
China. They do not specify though whether behind this acknowledgment the international 
community welcomes or is worried about such an amazing boom. 
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The impression is far more differentiated when it comes to how Asian neighbors are 
thought to perceive China. Four groups of definitions surface to this regard.  
 
The largest one, summing up to 43.2 percent of the interviewees’ answers, think the 
Asian neighbors see China as a large, huge, powerful and strong country, which is not 
only significant but even dominant and getting stronger.  
 
Then follow with 24.3 percent those who perceive a sense of fear and threat in the 
neighbors’ eyes. Behind the Chinese growth there would be a worrying challenge, a 
threat that is already evident politically whereas economically China is still regarded as 
helpful.  
 
A third group does not go so far as to detect such a strong sense of threat: 18.9 percent 
argue the neighbors do not have a clear idea about China yet. China is uncertain, 
potentially dominant and strong but still quite weak.  
 
The rest of the group is the one describing the neighbors’ impression just by means of 
positive adjectives, such as stable, cooperative, friendly and reliable.  
 
1.3 Chinese perception of security 
 
When asked whether they perceive any international threat upon Chinese security, the 
interviewees split into two major groups. Apart from a small though significant number 
of people (13.1%) who do not know how to reply to this question, 44.7 percent replied by 
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denying any sense of threat whereas 42.1 admitted to feel threatened. The latter when 
asked what represented the source of such a threat list several items, the main one being 
the Taiwanese issue and the US interference in it (40%), followed by “the US” (20%) and 
“the Taiwanese separatism issue” (13.3%). Others mention terrorism, the US interest rate 
policy, the problem of oil sources and Japan as causes of threat but these reasons all 
together account for a mere 26.6 percent of the answers to the sources of international 
threat upon China. 
 
1.4 How China perceives its international status 
 
Another issue that I thought it would be important to investigate when it comes to 
Chinese foreign policy is the Chinese perception of its international acknowledgment. 
Known as it is that China has developed a “sense of victimization” as a consequence of 
its colonial past and especially of the Japanese imperialism, it is relevant to understand 
whether this syndrome has been overcome or not in order to comprehend what Chinese 
foreign policy makers are heading to and aiming at.  
 
If they are still perceiving not to be properly acknowledged by the international 
community, Chinese are indeed more likely to develop and accelerate an ambitious and 
active role in strengthening the Chinese role in global affairs and in asserting the Chinese 
weight on the international stage. On the contrary, if they are satisfied with the current 
global consideration of the PRC, they are more likely to prioritize cooperative attitudes 
over demanding  approaches.  
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Interviewees’ opinions to this regard are very different. 13.1 percent of them does not 
know what to reply and the rest splits in quite an equal way among those who are 
complaining of and those who are happy with the current status internationally enjoyed 
by the PRC. To be more precise, the satisfied ones account to 44.7 percent of the total 
interviewees, whereas the discontented represent 42.1 of the global sample.  
 
Some interviewees added an explanation to their reply and what we can argue on this 
basis is that China is satisfied with its political international recognition being a member 
of the UN Security Council whereas it still has a long way ahead with regard to economic 
international affirmation being still a developing country. An interviewee added that, 
apart from the political and economic sphere, the Chinese cultural potential is still not 
acknowledged. The rest of the world keeps judging China upon Western standards and 
does not conceive the existence of “a Chinese model” legitimated by the unique historical 
past of the PRC.  
 
Conclusions  
 
The picture ensuing of this first chapter demonstrates to be rooted on neat pillars logically 
connected to each other. The image the sample provides leaves no room for incoherence 
and let us draw some important conclusions.  
 
First of all, the international arena is dominated by an arrogant hegemonic power, i.e. the 
United States. China has never approved of hegemonic attitudes and already Mao Zedong 
used to say that the Middle Empire would never seek hegemony. Besides, the American 
hegemony represents a threat to Beijing. Over the last years China has developed the 
 23 
opinion that all international strategies that the US are conceiving are meant to slow 
down the Chinese development and to restrain somehow its potential at large (Saich, 
2001:281).  
 
The conviction emerged by these answers thus confirms the presence of this suspicion 
even to present days. In spite of the official launch of the “war on terrorism”, the PRC 
still believes that the American super-power is nurturing offensive plans against Beijing 
and the lack of valid alternatives to Washington’s hegemony does not help reducing the 
risks upon China. This explains why those interviewees that detect threats upon Chinese 
security inevitably connect them to the US and its claims in managing world and local 
affairs. 
 
At light of these considerations, it follows a general appreciation of the European Union 
and the United Nations mission. Since these institutions embody the importance of 
mediation, compromise and negotiation in dealing with international relations, they gain 
the Chinese approval. Moreover, many interviewees express the wish that these 
institutions are able of strengthening their capacity of managing global affairs in order to 
reduce the arrogant hegemonic claims of single actors. 
 
As to other important actors, Japan and Russia, the sample is consistent with Cao and 
Tang’s analysis on the Chinese relations with Tokyo and Washington. The two 
outstanding scholars of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences outlined that the 
empowerment of the American-Japanese relations has implied and contributed to a 
rapprochement between Beijing and Moscow (Cao and Tang, 2002:139). Not only China 
keeps claiming Japan for its unsettled historical faults, but it looks at it as to “the UK of 
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Asia”, closer to American than to Asian interests (Glosserman, 2003:108). According to 
Green’s viewpoint, instead, “Strong ties between Tokyo and Washington would increase 
United States leverage vis-à-vis China by deterring Beijing from any attempt to increase 
its own hegemony in the region through a strategy of separating the United States from 
its allies” (Glosserman, 2003:107). 
 
In addition to that, it is also true that the increasing importance of Russia to Chinese eyes 
is due to the growing Chinese need for energy resources and to the fact that Russia is 
anyway a nuclear power (Wang, 2002:32).  
 
Another neat outcome of this first chapter is the clear differentiation of the Chinese 
passive perception according to the origin of the perceivers. By looking at the following 
graphs it is possible to visualize how differently the Chinese feel to be perceived when 
they are evaluated by the international community at large, compared to when they are 
observed by Asian neighbors.  
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There are two main outcomes ensuing of these graphs.  
The first is that the international community’s description is quite homogenous and does 
not include stark differences in descriptive terms. In a sense, the variety of replies can be 
measured on an ideal spectrum of definitions ranging from a positive observation of the 
Chinese growth potential up to the attention-concern to the huge dimensions of this same 
potential. 
 
The replies about the Asian perceptions of China are instead not only far more diversified 
but can hardly be grouped into a unique spectrum. In this case, the answers underline 
different nuances. They touch upon issues of economic growth, potential challenge and 
threat, international attitudes, in addition to the features already indicated in the previous 
graph. Arguably, this self-evident difference in terms of passive perception is an 
important element in shaping Beijing’s attitude towards foreign actors.  
 
The same weight can be attached to the Chinese self-perception as an actor of the 
international arena. When asked whether they are satisfied or disappointed with the 
present acknowledgment enjoyed by the PRC in the international community, the 
interviewees though split in two quite equal groups. This is the only issue, in this chapter, 
that has not given birth to a major outstanding trend. When satisfaction was detected, it 
referred exclusively to the political status recognized to the PRC whereas criticism 
regarded its economic performance. However, the almost homogeneous bifurcation of the 
sample about this issues does not allow to draw a predominant conclusion. 
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2. CHINA AND WORLD POLITICS 
 
2.1 China’s partners in foreign policy 
 
The interviewees were asked what they regard as China’s current main partner in foreign 
policy at large. Fifty percent of the answers indicate the US as the country working the 
most with the PRC in shaping and managing global political affairs. 23.6 percent 
mentioned Europe, 18.4 percent Russia and the remaining 2.6 percent Japan.  
 
This picture strengthens the image of a deeply rooted American presence, a potentially 
important Russian and European role as well as of a politically declining Japanese 
charisma, as already surfaced on the perceptions about world key-players. 
 
2.2 China’s perception of challenges 
 
Consistently with the image depicted by previous analysis, the mostly ticked international 
challenge to the Chinese international status and role is indeed the “presence of a 
hegemonic power”, marked by as many as 44.7 percent of the interviewees6. It goes 
without saying that such power refers to the US whose role in world politics seems to the 
Chinese dominant and overwhelming. 
 
                                                
6 In the questions regarding challenges interviwees could tick up to three answers. Thus figures in 
percentage refer to the total amount of interviewees and not to the total number of answers provided.  
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Interestingly enough, the second order of factors equally considered as a challenge are 
“democratization” (as a source of instability) and “religious and ethnic conflicts”, 
followed by seven point percent by “poverty” and “environmental issues”, as to 
demonstrate how seemingly sensitive to environmental care Chinese are getting.  
“Human rights issues” and “international economic relations” are then considered as a 
threat to Chinese world affirmation (21%), though more dangerous than “globalization”, 
“increasing global insecurity” and “weak international organizations” that are perceived 
as a challenge only by 15.7 percent of the interviewed sample. 
 
What is more striking, especially because of its difference with Western countries’ 
perceptions, “terrorism” and “nuclear threats” represent two of the least marked sources 
of challenges to the Chinese. Only 13.1 percent of the interviewees listed these items 
among the threats likely to jeopardize China’s international role and status, whereas only 
2.6 percent mentioned “migration” among such dangers and nobody at all looked at 
AIDS as a serious issue that could eventually act to China’s detriment.  
 
With regard to the regional problems that could endanger the international Chinese role 
and status, the “Taiwanese issue” leads undoubtedly the list, ticked as it was by 92.1 
percent of the interviewees.  
 
The second worrisome factor (44.7%) is represented by the feared “Japanese 
remilitarization”, closely followed (36.8%) by “controversies with Japan”. The massive 
reference to Japanese issues as a source of danger for China does not but confirm the 
description of Japan, previously given by the same sample, as of an “aggressive 
challenging” neighbor.  
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The third group of factors perceived by the Chinese as a challenge is more 
heterogeneous, ranging  from the “North Korean crisis” to “religious and ethnic 
conflicts”, from “pro-democracy and pro-independence upheavals” to “terrorism”. These 
replies amount just to 13.1 percent of the given answers, whereas 10.5 percent is 
represented by "territorial disputes” and “human rights issues”. 
 
In the regional framework, the environmental care looses noticeably importance, marked 
as it was only by 7.8 percent of the interviewees.  
 
Once again, instead, issues related to migration captured nobody’s attention whereas 2.6 
percent added the “US presence in Asia” and the “Chinese economic dependence on 
Russia, Japan and West Asia” as serious threats to the PRC’s global affirmation.   
 
2.3 Chinese desirable foreign policy aims and modus operandi 
 
After the perception of threats follows the perception of goals that Chinese foreign policy 
makers are expected to pursue.  
 
The vast majority of the interviewees regards “economic growth” as the major goal to be 
achieved in the national foreign policy. If 76.3 percent of the sample prioritizes economic 
development, then follows a considerable 42.1 percent of interviewees that underline the 
importance of  “peace”. This list is perfectly consistent with Deng Xiaoping’s motto for 
the promotion of Chinese development. As he pointed out in a speech in 1984, “Peace 
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and economic development are the two really great issues confronting the world today” 
(Deng, 1984:46-47). 
 
These two issues are prioritized to matters such as “social development” (21%) or 
“international acknowledgment of China’s power” and “social equality” (both amounting 
to 18.4%)7. Far less successful are the remaining items: “human rights promotion” is 
perceived as a desirable priority foreign policy goal only by 5.2 percent of the sample, the 
“communist revolution”  gains a mere 2.6 percent. As we have already  noticed, “war on 
terrorism” does not mean to the Chinese as much as it does to Westerners: none of the 
interviewees actually considers it as a goal to aim at in domestic foreign policy!  
 
Some of the interviewees add other issues allegedly standing for significant questions of 
foreign policy. “Political unification”, “energy and resources” as well as “international 
acknowledgment of Chinese culture” are perceived totally by 7.8 percent as matters to be 
seriously dealt with in the current foreign policy agenda. 
 
But how should China negotiate internationally to better pursue these goals? Should it 
develop an empire-nostalgic strategy of unilateralism, develop only bilateral partnerships 
or cooperate multilaterally?  
 
The issue is pretty controversial given the regional position of China and its peculiar 
cultural and historical roots. Still in the Qing era, “China, much more than the emerging 
                                                
7 In the questions regarding goals  interviwees could tick up to two answers. Thus figures in percentage 
refer to the total amount of interviewees and not to the total number of answers provided. 
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great powers of Europe, had no natural allies and no permanent enemies, but a complex 
of mutually separable relationships with its neighbors” (Kirby, 1994:17).  
 
In spite of that, 78.9 percent of the interviewees thinks that multilateralism fits the best 
the present Chinese negotiation needs. This strategy, indeed, involves a larger number of 
actors and is the soundest IR pattern working in the long run.  
Nevertheless 13.1 percent of the sample admits that multilateralism is too long and 
farraginous a process and does not guarantee problem-solving as quickly and efficiently 
as bilateralism does. To these people China should first develop a bilateral cooperation 
pattern in order to safeguard its major interests and then, as a second stage, shift to a 
multilateral system.   
 
In a sense, the PRC seems to be looking for a middle-way between a wider involvement 
of foreign actors that be not too binding though. To the Chinese, international 
cooperation is a priority but it does not have to infringe national sovereignty. This might 
seem paradoxical and to a certain extent self-contradictory but it does have a sense also in 
light of the traditional Chinese attitude of pursuing “a multiplicity of independent co-
operative relationships, but not alliances” (Kirby, 1994:18).  
 
The question, nowadays, is how this strategy can be still pursued given the increasing 
globalization and deeper connections among countries. And this issue represents actually 
one of the most interesting challenges of the present Chinese pattern of development.  
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Conclusions 
 
The Chinese sample’s ideas about current and future foreign policy are very clear. 
 
As a matter of fact, Beijing still has to count on the US as its principal partner. Beijing 
acknowledges the power and the resources of Washington and has to take them into 
account whenever planning international manoeuvres. As indicated also by Wang 
Shimin, in spite of mutual political tensions and skepticism, the Sino-American relations 
are strong given the increasing commercial and economic links (Wang, 2002:34).  
 
Simultaneously, though, right the American hegemony is considered as the main 
international challenge threatening the PRC. Not only is the hegemony criticized per se 
but it is also harshly condemned when it leads to the US interference on the Taiwanese 
issue. If Washington’s hegemony is regarded as a major threat to China at large, its 
unwished involvement into this delicate local affair is regarded as a considerable obstacle 
to the settlement of the Taiwanese case itself. 
 
The second major problem envisaged by the interviewees in their regional security is the 
Japanese case. Tang and Cao had precisely depicted the Chinese disagreement with the 
alleged attempts of remilitarization and the outcomes of the questionnaire do but confirm 
this matter of fact (Cao and Tang, 2002:133). 
 
What might look surprising to a Westerner observer is that among all these priorities and 
challenges, the Chinese hardly mention terrorism. Only 13 percent lists it as an 
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international threat whereas none expects the “war on terrorism” to be a major foreign 
policy goal.  
 
An explanation to this apparent oddity is provided by Sun Tianhai. According to this 
expert of Chinese international politics, September 11 has been interpreted by the 
Chinese differently from the Americans and in classical geopolitical terms. Alongt the 
Chinese standpoint, a precise actor has launched an attack to a determined territory. The 
criminal and the target are clearly individuated. The war to be fought is then not that 
much different from any other traditional one. To the Chinese, it is unconceivable to 
think of a war without territorial limits and temporal deadlines (Sun, 2002:112). 
 
However, the marginal importance attached to this war does not mean that the sample is 
not sensitive to peace issues. Quite the opposite, instead, given that economic growth and 
peace are perceived as the principal goals to be pursued by Beijing’s diplomacy. This 
data confirms Harding’s thesis of the Chinese need for a stable and peaceful environment 
in order to wholly concentrate on domestic development.  
 
Consistently to this, multilateralism is  indicated as the best negotiation strategy. A 
mainstream in favor of multilateralism has recently surfaced in China. By involving as 
large the number of actors as possible, Beijing hopes to strengthen regional security and 
to reduce the clash with Washington. A wide cooperation is more viable and fruitful for 
the PRC than any direct confrontation with another big power (Cao and Tang, 2002:137)  
 
Thus, again, all the Chinese concerns are rooted on the necessity of creating a stable 
environment. In this developing stage, the PRC intends to concentrate all its resources 
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and efforts to carry out its modernization and to empower its political potential. In a 
sense, peace is not only good per se but is all the more valuable given that it allows to 
divert energies to other likewise important goals. 
 
As a conclusion, the path is still the one recommended by Jiang Zemin: “Increase trust, 
reduce trouble, carry out cooperation, avoid confrontation”(Fu, 2003:311). 
 
3. SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS 
 
Regardless of their mutual consideration, China and Japan are still the geopolitical pillars 
of the Asia Pacific Region.  
 
This partnership is though a quite delicate one, marked as it still is with deep-rooted 
injuries and legacy dating back to World Wars time, the main being the Japanese 
treatment of China during colonialism and in the middle of World War Second. The PRC 
claims that Japan has not provided adequate apologies yet. Thus until this problem is not 
solved the bilateral relationship will keep being tense and extremely vulnerable whenever 
a change occurs in both countries’ domestic and foreign politics.  
 
In spite of this complaining Chinese attitude towards Japan, the vast majority of the 
interviewees (65.7%) acknowledges that their homeland needs the “unpleasant” neighbor 
to pursue its domestic interests. Both Beijing and Tokyo are aware of their mutual 
“dependence”, given that “Japan needs the Chinese market to keep its economy going as 
much as China needs the Japanese market to continue its rapid growth” (The Japan Times 
Online, March 5, 2004).  
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Albeit there are still several historical issues to be settled, the bilateral partnership is 
expected to continue, to both countries’ benefit. The question then is what kind of path it 
should embark on and what kind of negotiating strategy both countries should develop to 
empower their partnership meanwhile reducing their historical tensions. As it was put by 
the Japanese task force on foreign relations, “The relationship with China is the most 
important theme in Japan’s foreign policy at the outset of the 21st century. For both 
countries, the relationship is one that interweaves ‘cooperation and coexistence’ with 
‘competition and friction’” (the Japanese Task Force on Foreign Relations for the Prime 
Minister, 2004).  
 
In view of this longed bilateral empowerment, though, the Japanese attempts to reform its 
military forces do not seem to help. In the past few months significant sectors of the 
military and policy-making domains refreshed indeed the issue of the “Japanese right” to 
be provided with a normal defense force, being Japan one of the most advanced countries 
in the world and feeling particularly weak in times of terrorist threats. The matter does 
not just touch upon military issues and is more widely a question of national identity. In 
turn, “Japans’ quest for national identity is the key to its quest for a foreign policy option 
that gives it at least symbolic freedom from the US global strategy” (Rozman, 2003:539). 
 
The “military handicap” is legitimated by the Japanese aggressiveness in World War 
times and is constitutionally established. Hence, a major political and legal reform is 
necessary to free the country from its military mutilation. Proposals and speeches done 
with a renewed strength early this year seemed to many observers a first step toward this 
revolutionary change.  
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Without any doubt, China is among the countries that fear and discourage the most a 
possible Japanese remilitarization. China Daily is a perfect spokesman of the Chinese 
viewpoint on the issue, when it writes that, “As a responsible member of the East Asian 
community, it is in its own best interest as well as that of the region that Japan continue 
its pacifist policies” (China Daily Online, February 19, 2004).  
 
To Beijing, the reform proposals recently put forward are unmistakable evidence of the 
rebirth of Japanese aggressiveness. Indeed, 86.8 percent of the interviewees think of this 
political change underway in Japan in terms of an attempted remilitarization and only 
10.5 percent denies a Japanese intention of restoring an authentic army. Not only they 
mostly interpret these changes as an involution but they also strongly criticize a possible 
remilitarization. Three interviewees out of four are convinced that Japan should not 
restore its army and modify its current defense situation because this would inevitably 
result in a threat to China. 
 
These changes in the Japanese political agenda have clearly contributed to create a new 
diplomatic climate. 42 percent of the interviewees argues that in the last ten years the 
Sino-Japanese relation has worsened whereas only according to 29 percent the bilateral 
health has improved.  
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The new bilateral climate is mirrored on the perception of the current relationship with 
Tokyo. Importantly enough, nearly one interviewee out of four admits not to be able to 
evaluate it and 71 percent of the sample judges the Sino-Japanese partnership as “fragile 
and vulnerable but still stable”.  
 
If only 5.2 percent considers the Sino-Japanese relationship “positive and sound”, 
however the occurred changes do not seem to have worrisomely endangered the 
“necessary friendship”. It is true that 18.4 percent perceives “an extreme instability” as a 
hallmark of the present bilateral relation but the majority interprets the current situation 
as a transition from old principles to new ones.  
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Instability, they argue, comes from the lack of sound new rules as it always happens in 
transitory times. Then the challenge lies on the ability of establishing shortly a complete 
new framework within which a new Sino-Japanese balance should be developed.  
 
 
4. CHINA AND NORTHEAST ASIA 
 
4.1 Regional partners 
 
If the United States are perceived as the major Chinese partner in its foreign policy at 
large, interestingly the same can not be said about regional policy.  
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To 28.9 percent of the interviewees Russia actually represents the major partner China 
has in dealing with all the issues concerning the area stretching from the Korean 
peninsula to the PRC, from Japan to the Asian part of Russia. The cold-war American 
enemy seems to the Chinese weak and declining right now but its potential in terms of 
growth and military strength is never underestimated.  
 
The US and South Korea are the other two regional powers that the sample considers 
significant key-players in the Chinese regional policy. The American superpower is still 
regarded as the main actor by 26.3 percent and the Korean democracy by 21.0 percent.  
 
Japan seems instead marginalized. Historical tensions and its peculiar military status 
make him a relevant partner only to 18.4 percent of the interviewees.  
 
4.2 The North Korean crisis 
 
One of the hottest issues on the regional stage is undoubtedly represented by the political 
tensions in the Korean peninsula and the nuclear threats behind Pyongyang’s isolation. 
Fears of a nuclear war as well as of serious side-effects in case of a North Korean 
collapse make the international community particularly concerned with and cautious in 
managing the geopolitical question.  
 
For reasons of geopolitical strategies, domestic interests and international prestige the 
People’s Republic of China has been on the diplomatic forefront in the international 
attempts to cope with the issue. 
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The Korean problem lies in two factors: the nuclear threat and the political liaison 
between the North and the South. All the range of solutions includes the possible 
combinations of different settlement of both aspects.  
 
The first concern of the entire international community is to be sure not to unleash a 
nuclear threat that would in turn give rise to a regional and hence global nuclear race. To 
this regard, the whole sample actually agrees that a peaceful and unnuclear solution to the 
Korean crisis is the most desirable for the PRC too.  
 
Differences instead arise when it comes to the political settlement of the peninsula. 
Although the majority (51.3%) wishes a reunification, a significant 10 percent is unsure 
as to which outcome would fit the best the Chinese needs. On the other side, thinking of 
problems such as migration, refugees, political instability and economic collapse ensuing 
of a reunification, 32.4 percent is convinced that the preservation of a separated peninsula 
would be far more beneficial to China. 
 
4.3 Chinese regional foreign policy  
 
When asked about the most serious regional challenges for China, the interviewees point 
to the Taiwanese issue nearly unanimously. No wonder then that when it comes to 
Chinese foreign policy priorities in the region, 78.9 percent of the sample replies that the 
settlement of the Taiwanese matter is the first goal policy-makers should try to pursue.  
 
To have an idea of how prominent this historical issue is to the Chinese it is enough to 
think that the second issue the sample is mostly concerned with is chosen just by 31.5 
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percent of them. In this case it regards economics, namely the “promotion of Asian 
economic growth” (that had surfaced has the priority aim in the Chinese foreign policy at 
large).  
 
Political stability and economic prosperity are thus the main expectations of the Chinese 
for their future. Improvement of the relations both with the US and Japan (and in this 
case the settlement of the “Japanese remilitarization”, too) are secondary objectives, 
though still noticeable (they are both chosen by 18.4 percent of the interviewees). What 
seems to be far less relevant to the people is the development of Asian integration and of 
environment care (both 7.9%), the promotion of human rights, of poverty alleviation 
programs and the overall settlement of territorial disputes (each gets to 5.2%).  
Interestingly enough, only 2.6 percent of the interviewees considers the Korean issue a 
hot issue to be put on top of the regional political agenda and, once again, none includes 
terrorism among such priorities.  
 
4.4 Regional scenarios 
 
According to the Chinese viewpoint, the PRC is going to become the major power in 
Northeast Asia.  
 
To 60.5 percent of the sample, China is already such a regional key-player, noticeably 
overtaking both the US and Japan. Although the American presence in the region is still a 
significant one, it is China that leads local affairs and is going to lead them more and 
more in the forthcoming years. The “regional superpower” in the future will most likely 
be China according to as many as 8 interviewees out of 10.  
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The Japanese decline seems out of question, with fewer and fewer Chinese considering 
Tokyo as a  prominent regional actor not only nowadays but especially in the future (the 
percentage of those who consider Japan as the major regional power drops from 10.5% to 
5.2% when it regards future perspectives). 
 
From the answers provided it seems that Northeast Asia is clearly characterized by the 
presence of a major regional key-player, be it China or Japan. To the interviewees, such a 
presence is a guarantee of stability and indeed 68.4 percent perceives a “balance of 
power” in the region, given that political and military power is mostly concentrated in 
China whereas the economic primacy still belongs to Japan.  
Hence, the region seems stable to six interviewees out of ten but peace is not assured by 
stability alone. Indeed, only one out of these six interviewees argues that currently the 
region is enjoying both stability and peace whereas to half of the sample the situation is 
not peaceful at all. If nobody finds the current geopolitical status “extremely insecure”, 
21 percent describes it as “tense and unstable”.  
 
The overall picture is then one of precariousness that matches with the previous idea of a 
transition underway in the area.  
 
What would then help assure long-term stability and peace? The European integration 
process has sounded as a model Northeast Asia could follow too and indeed 55 percent of 
the sample agrees with the opportunity of “translating” the European recipe in Asian 
terms. Nevertheless it remains a still significant group (31.5%) that disagrees with that. 
The explanation they provide is that the European model can be viable to Northeast Asia 
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only in the very long-run because regional backgrounds are deeply different and Asia still 
lacks some basic requirements. In spite of that, they also admit that a similar integration 
process would be necessary and desirable.  
 
The main outcome is the acknowledgment that a wider international cooperation is 
needed in view of regional stability, peace and prosperity. The condemnation of 
hegemony has surfaced clearly and a neat preference (68.4%) has been given to “broader 
international cooperation” as the key to a strengthened regional balance of power. 
Bilateralism still means a lot to the Chinese (15.7%), especially when it involves such 
actors as the US and Japan but “regional cooperation” is gaining increasing success and 
favor (5.2%).  
What seems feasible and desirable in the short run is actually an empowerment of local 
regional cooperation and integration processes and hence a strengthening of 
multilateralism. This would convey a sounder negotiating potential to Northeast Asia as a 
region and would make it a major world player without jeopardizing both local and 
global interests.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The picture ensuing of this chapter is very clear and coherent again. 
 
The first uncontroversial outcome is that the sample is convinced that the PRC is the 
principal geopolitical actor in Northeast Asia. As Hu Jintao said, “China is the driving 
force for Asian development” and will strengthen this role in the years to come (Fu, 
2003:309). A significant implication of this is that the empowerment of Beijing’s 
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geopolitical role in the region is being paralleled by the fading leverage of Tokyo and 
Washington.  
 
Second, if the USA are China’s main partner in its foreign policy at large, as surfaced in 
chapter two, the same can not be said about China’s regional politics. In this context, 
indeed, Russia is rehabilitated, consistently whit the description provided in the first 
chapter. As the following graphs illustrate, the alliances the PRC can count on at regional 
level are broader and more diversified than those characterizing global politics.  
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In Northeast Asia, indeed, there is more of a “balance of power”, with several significant 
actors contributing to shape international relations. In the global arena, on the contrary, 
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the image is much more definite: the US lead unthreatened the game, followed by far by 
Europe and Russia, whereas Japan hardly partake.  
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Consistently with these first results, the vast majority of the sample admits that the 
geopolitical situation in the region is balanced, with no hegemonic attitudes and trends. 
Nevertheless, this does not necessarily result in a peaceful and stable climate. The 
detailed picture provided by the following graph illustrates indeed that to half of the 
sample the situation seems not peaceful and to 20 percent of it even “tense and unstable”. 
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The overall image, then, is that of a geopolitical area undergoing a process of transition, 
which implies by definition a phase of precariousness. Although the Korean issue 
represents a hot issue on the Chinese agenda only to roughly three percent of the 
interviewees, the region has diverse reasons for feeling insecure and unstable. This is a 
matter of great concern for Beijing’s agenda; after all, “As a large country, China has a 
responsibility to safeguard regional security and stability” (Fu, 2003:310).  
 
A wider cooperation pattern, possibly getting close to that achieved by the European 
Union, is envisaged as a desirable path to embark on in order to enhance stability and 
peace.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
1. The pillars  
 
From the answers provided we can argue that Levine’s pillars are still largely valid.  
 
Undoubtedly the Chinese still regard themselves as a great people and a great nation, 
deserving a better fate than the one they currently have, even though at present they enjoy 
a satisfactory international acknowledgement. Economic growth is the main avenue to a 
better global affirmation and to that aim peace is to be continuously safeguarded. Political 
stability, both domestically and abroad, together with a high rate of growth keep being 
perceived as priority requirements.  
 
China is already regarded as the main regional power but will undoubtedly play a leading 
role in the years to come. According to the interviewees, by developing a sound 
multilateral system and by enhancing its economic relations the PRC will be an efficient 
regional leader with no hegemonic attitudes, as confirmed early this year by the Chinese 
Premier Wen Jiabao. He repeatedly declared indeed that “China does not seek hegemony 
now, nor will it seek hegemony even after it became powerful in the future” (People’s 
Daily, March 14, 2004). This regional picture further stresses the underlying recognition 
of the greatness of the Chinese nation and people. 
 
The Taiwanese issue and some minor conflicts remind us of the Chinese sacred value of 
national sovereignty. The “rebel province” is predominantly considered as a threat and a 
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challenge. As such, it is on top of the Chinese political agenda and has to be managed by 
the PRC alone, with no American interference.   
 
2. A status-quo maintainer?  
 
At the light of these outcomes, it is confirmed that Beijing is increasingly intervening into 
world affairs but meanwhile it is determined to play a more incisive role than that of a 
mere status-quo maintainer.  
 
It surfaces clearly that China intends to slow down and restrict the Japanese ambitions, 
the American interference and hegemony and to manage delicately the Korean crisis. The 
priority is of course that of making the surrounding environment as stable as necessary 
for domestic development at large. The reason behind that is that as long as all local 
conflicts, first the Taiwanese one, are not settled, Beijing cannot devote all its resources 
and energies to the modernization it aims at. 
 
Thus if it is confirmed that the Chinese international role is increasing and strengthening, 
it is though not just restricted to the preservation of the current state of world affairs. As 
Gerald Segal phrased it, “China matters militarily to a certain extent simply because it is 
not a status quo power” (Segal, 2004:15).  
 
The more the Chinese power grows, the more demands it nurtures and the more 
expectations it entitles the nation to. The escalade to the “deserved fate” implies clear 
political goals and likewise neat economic projects in order to wholly unfold the 
country’s potential. 
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3. A coherent foreign policy 
 
Chinese culture might be incoherent but its foreign policy has uncontroversial hallmarks, 
ensuing of generally shared interviewees’ viewpoints and logically connected to the 
increasing Chinese involvement in global affairs.  
 
First, the Chinese feel overwhelmed by the American presence and attitude both in world 
affairs and particularly in Northeast Asia. Although half of the sample acknowledges that 
the US is still China’s main geopolitical partner, a strong condemnation of the American 
hegemony recurrently surfaces. The post- cold war superpower is recognized as a 
superior power but this does not allow for its predominant, aggressive and arrogant 
attitude in dealing with world politics. The US is all the more criticized for its excessive 
interference in the Taiwanese issue which does not but make the problem settlement 
more complicated and uneasy. 
 
Second, Japan keeps being looked at as an unpleasant neighbor, nowadays becoming 
further threatening. Tokyo’s attempts to change its military status, in addition to its 
“historical guilt”, worsen the image China has of its geopolitical counterpart. The US’ 
ally is still considered extremely aggressive and increasingly ambitious. Still detaining a 
significant economic power, Japan is though politically declining in the international 
arena but is supposedly trying to reverse such a trend. Remilitarization and claims to have 
a seat in the UN Council are some of the most blatant steps in that direction, which China 
does not approve at all. 
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Third, unlike what happens among West public opinions, China does not feel threatened 
by terrorism or at least does not regard terrorism as one of the most serious challenges 
upon its present security. “War on terrorism” is considered by none of the interviewees as 
a goal of Beijing’s foreign policy which is rather dominated by two other priorities.  
 
Political stability and economic growth are undoubtedly the issues that the Chinese 
people care the most about. Domestic economic growth is the most desirable goal that the 
PRC should try to pursue and the promotion of Asian economy is the second most 
expected regional foreign policy objective. After all, China is quite happy of its political 
emancipation but still feels unsatisfied with its economic development. In spite of the 
recent economic records achieved, it still remains a developing country, endowed though 
with an immense potential. Empowering the country’s economy is then generally 
perceived as a necessary step on the way to the complete unfolding of the “Chinese 
grandeur”.  
 
The settlement of the Taiwanese issue is the priority on the regional foreign policy 
agenda and the foremost regional challenge hanging over China. It represents actually 
more than a matter of national pride and of historical concern as it has deep implications 
on long-term peace, security and stability. 
 
Peace and stability still have to take sound roots in Northeast Asia. Although 68 percent 
of the interviewees perceive a balance of power in the region, half of the sample does not 
depict the regional status as peaceful and one out of five interviewees even describe it as 
tense and unstable. Regional precariousness seems to be the predominant feeling, largely 
due to the transition phase that most of the local countries are going through.  
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Hegemony is largely recognized as a detrimental geopolitical pattern and what is warmly 
desired is the development of a broader framework of regional and international 
cooperation. If traditionally Asia used to adopt a bilateral approach to foreign affairs, 
nowadays multilateralism is increasingly preferred. A larger involvement of actors and a 
broader adoption of international rules is the key to stronger integration.  
 
To this regard and in spite of clear differences, the European experience is often 
considered as a good model to look at. Although still weak in several circumstances, both 
the Bruxelles experiment and the UN mission win the Chinese approval. The mediation 
and negotiation skills of these institutions are continuously praised by the sample. 
Nonetheless, it underlines simultaneously how feeble they both still are towards the 
American dominant and imperialistic attitude in the global arena.   
 
These four elements constitute the fil-rouge of Chinese foreign policy for the years to 
come. They are logically connected to each other and they all rest on the following 
cardinal points. 
 
First, the interviewees soundly agree with the perception that China is already the major 
regional power and is going to strengthen such a role in the forthcoming years.  
 
Second, Russia is estimated as a very valuable partner for both local and global affairs. 
Moscow is described mostly as a currently feeble world actor whose potential though is 
nonetheless still significant, as much as nearly one interviewee out of three regards 
Russia as the main regional partner of the PRC. 
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Third, the Chinese feels to be perceived in markedly positive terms by the international 
community at large, which can sound pretty different from general opinion in the West. 
Indeed, few interviewees feel to be considered as a “threat” or a “danger” by the rest of 
the world and when that happens, it is mostly related to the Asian neighbors’ perception. 
I argue that a sound positive perception of the own national image and role in the world 
can not but constitute a healthy starting point for an escalade in the international arena.  
 
Fourth, the major regional Chinese “alliance”, i.e. that with Japan, is generally depicted 
as fragile, vulnerable but stable. The more Tokyo tries to insert changes to its status in 
domestic and world politics, the more Beijing seems ready to show its rooted 
disagreement and its superior international leverage.  
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